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Abstract
The paper analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss voting  
assistance application “smartvote” and post-election behaviour in the Swiss lower house between  
2003 and 2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently came up  
in  parliament.  Unlike  previous  studies  which  assessed  the  program-to-policy  linkage  of  
governments or party groups the paper examines the question at the level of individual MPs which 
seems appropriate for political systems which follow the idea of power dispersion.
While  the  average  rate  of  political  congruence  is  at  some 85  percent,  a  multivariate  analysis  
detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her  
mind once elections are over. The results show that positional changes are more likely if (1) MPs  
are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the vote is not about a  
party's core issue, (4) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (5) if  
the pre-election statement  is  in disagreement with  the majority position of the legislative  party 
group. The last-mentioned factor is paramount: the farer away a candidate's pre-election profile  
from his  or  her  party  is  located,  the  weaker  turns  out  to  be  the  electoral  link  of  promissory  
representation.
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Introduction: Supply-driven promissory representation
In the 2006 “Role of Government IV” poll of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
roughly 30 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement: “People we elect as MPs try to 
keep the promises they have made during the election” while another 33 percent took an indifferent 
stance. In more sizeable representative democracies like Britain, Germany, or the United States the 
share of discontent is even higher.4 That MPs are not given too much credit by the general public 
can  have  many  reasons,  a  positional  gap  between  pre-election  statements  and  post-election 
behaviour is one of them. We might call this the Wysiwyg problem in the electoral connection, as 
abbreviation for “What you see is what you get”: During election campaigns, candidates and parties 
wrap their  positions and raise some expectations with the voters.  Once elected,  the unwrapped 
policies come to  the disappointment of many,  and voters get the strong feeling that what  MPs 
implement is different from what they saw in the election campaign showcase before.
At the theoretical level, the problem is considered differently. A straightforward view is the mandate 
model (or responsible party model) in which parties compete with different political programs and 
the winner receives the mandate (and bears responsibility) to implement it (Schattschneider 1942; 
Downs  1957).  Periodic  elections  then  give  the  electorate  the  opportunity  to  evaluate  the 
performance of the incumbent government and, if necessary, to modify their voting decision. This 
ideal conception of representative democracy has been criticised on various grounds. For instance, 
proponents of salience theory doubt if  parties during election campaigns really provide directly 
comparable policy alternatives, instead of engaging in a kind of indirect competition (Budge and 
Hofferbert 1990; Klingemann et al. 1994). Moreover, mandate theory in its most naïve form ignores 
information  asymmetries  between  principals  and  agents  (agency  loss  problems;  Strøm  2003), 
limited  information  processing  capabilities  of  the  electorate,  and  the  fact  that  problems  of 
preference  aggregation  prevent  political  actors  from knowing  what  “their  voters”  want  (Riker 
1982).  The most fundamental  critique,  however,  affects  the implication that the mandate model 
establishes  a  “simple  demand-input”  or  “dyadic”  relationship  between  the  represented  and  the 
representatives (Pitkin 1967; Wahlke 1971; Eulau and Karps 1978). Most critics do not challenge 
the concept of political (or substantive/issue) representation in principle, but only the rigour in its 
delegational  interpretation  (for  instance,  see  Pitkin  1967:  209-10).  And  it  seems  also  widely 
accepted  that  alternative  “paradigms”  of  representation  can  exist  in  parallel  (Powell  2004; 
Mansbridge 2003). 
4 See http://www.issp.org/data.shtml.
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In line with Powell  (2000) who emphasises “a voter's  eye view” of elections we argue that in 
contemporary election campaigns the driving force behind the representational link between the 
electorate  and the elected is  the supply side,  that  is  public  statements,  quasi-promises  and real 
election pledges of candidates and parties. The recent emergence of web-based voting assistance 
applications, in which parties or individual candidates can enter their political profile by responding 
to a number of political questions, further strengthens this view (Ladner et al. 2008a; Walgrave et al. 
2008). The programmatic orientation of candidates and parties leads to the inseparability of the 
choice  of  party/candidate  from the  content  of  their  electoral  appeals  (Mansergh  and  Thomson 
2007). Whenever candidates make explicit or implicit promises with regard to their post-electoral 
behaviour,  the  moral  duty  to  (at  least  try  to)  keep  these  promises  arises.  The  “promissory 
representation” model (Mansbridge 2003) draws on a fundamental principle which every modern 
society is based upon: confidence and reliance. So, in cases where candidates or parties present 
themselves to the electorate using explicit or implicit programmatic statements, why should voters 
not  be  allowed  to  take  the  offer  seriously  and  rely  on  due  implementation?  To  be  sure,  the 
promissory form of representation, too, should not be interpreted harshly: There are always good 
reasons  why  MPs  deviate  from what  they  stated  during  the  campaign  (see  Pitkin  1967),  and 
representatives should have both the right and the responsibility to adapt to changing conditions 
(lies and deception exempted). But as in any other relationship, be it political, social, or economic, 
the  electorate  should  cast  the  ballot  relying  on  the  assumption  that  they  can  believe  in  the 
programmatic statements of the “policy suppliers”. Otherwise, already low public confidence in 
politicians, as seen in the 2006 ISSP poll shown above, will further diminish (see also Dalton 2007).
These “normative criteria” of the promissory model of representation (Mansbridge 2003) serve as 
the  baseline  of  our  contribution.  Assuming  that,  and  not  testing  if,  a  supply-driven  voter's 
perspective on elections and behavioural strategies like prospective and retrospective voting exist 
(Powell 2000; for a critical review see Rehfeld 2009), the article deals with the question of issue 
congruence  before  and  after  elections:  To  what  extent  do  forward-looking  voters  see  their 
expectations  fulfilled?  How  can  deviating  issue  positions  be  explained?  These  questions  are 
examined in a Swiss context between 2003 and 2009. Before giving further details on the used 
dataset, the specification of the dependent and independent variables, as well as the analysis and 
discussion of the results of our research, we first proceed with an overview about the literature on 
the topic, followed by a short institutional contextualisation of the Swiss case.
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Pledge fulfilment in the literature
Existing studies  on the  subject  usually compare  election  pledges  in  party manifestos  or  public 
speeches with governmental policy actions after the election. First studies focused on the United 
States and Britain, followed by Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Sweden. Some of 
them take a comparative perspective, investigating the differences in the “effectiveness” (Royed 
1996) of the various democratic systems in enacting policies as promised before elections.5 Quite 
contrary to the common public perception of politicians as a notoriously untrustworthy guild, most 
studies find pledge fulfilment rates among government parties of 70 percent and more and consider 
them as astonishingly high.6 This discrepancy between citizens’ perceptions and the measured non-
fulfilment  rates  are  probably due  to  fact  that  for  citizens  the  non-fulfilment  of  one  single  but 
particularly  important  pledge  is  reason  enough  to  distrust  politicians.  As  a  general  pattern  in 
literature, and hardly surprising, government parties in single-party governments like Britain show 
the  highest  rates  of  over  80  percent  (Rose  1980;  Rallings  1987;  Royed  1996),  while  the 
effectiveness  of  the  “program-to-policy  linkage”  (Thomson  2001;  Klingemann  et  al.  1994)  in 
coalition governments7 and governments which operate in a dispersed-powers environment tends to 
be substantially lower at around 70 percent (Pomper and Lederman 1980; Pomper 1988; Royed 
1996; Royed and Borrelli 1999).8
Current research suffers from a number of methodological problems, as has been put forward by 
Costello and Thomson (2008) and Gallagher et al. (2006): First, party manifestos only bring up 
those issues which are highly salient for the party concerned.9 This results in a constrained choice of 
selected  pledges  because  the  salience  of  certain  issues  does  not  necessarily  coincide  between 
5 For the United States, see Pomper and Lederman (1980), Fishel (1985), Pomper (1988), Budge and Hofferbert 
(1990), Shaw (1998), Royed and Borelli (2002); Britain: Rose (1980); Canada: Rallings (1987); Greece: 
Kalogeropoulou (1989); the Netherlands: Thomson (1999, 2001); Ireland: Mansergh (2004), Costello and Thomson 
(2008); Sweden: Naurin (2007). Comparative studies comprise Rallings (1987), Royed (1996), Mansergh and 
Thomson (2007), as well as Costello and Thomson (2008).
6 That such findings come as a big surprise to the general public is documented by Naurin (2007) who experienced in 
Sweden hostile reactions towards her research project after the publication of her results.
7 The specificities of government coalitions is demonstrated by the following example from German politics (taken 
out of “faz.net”, the online issue of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 5 September 2006): “'As coalition, we are 
pitted against what has been said in the election campaign. This is unfair.' This said [vice chancellor] Franz 
Müntefering, without being asked to do so, at the 'We are back' press conference [....]. It was none of his wisecracks 
– and anything but a joke. He wanted to get it off his chest, and Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was sitting 
next to him, agreed” (own translation).
8 Opposition parties' pledge fulfilment is even in parliamentary systems above zero, because pledges may coincide 
with the the parliamentary majority (Costello and Thomson 2008), or the upper-house majority in bicameral systems 
may have a veto position in the lower house which forces the government to absorb the preferences of the 
opposition (Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Money 1997).
9 “In choosing their issues, parties act rationally, emphasizing the policy areas of their strength and neglecting the 
strong points of their opponents. They tend to be specific on these issues of direct, distributive benefit to the voters 
and to resort to rhetoric or vagueness where voters are unclear, uninterested, or divided” (Pomper 1988: 163); see 
also Budge and Hofferbert (1990).
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different parties. Second, party manifestos tend to be vague and they often stress “valence issues” 
(Stokes 1963), i.e. non-ideological statements which nobody is seriously opposed to because they 
merely assign a positive goal without saying how to achieve it.10 Moreover, the vagueness of some 
statements often leaves researchers puzzled whether to classify them as explicit election pledge or 
not.  Third,  existing  studies  ignore  different  mechanisms  of  law making in  legislative-executive 
relations.11 They usually apply a  parliamentary logic  that  government  is  identical  to  legislative 
majority, for which reason it seems fair to evaluate government actions on the basis of the party 
manifesto. This is also the reason why these studies in their analyses of pledge fulfilment rates 
focused exclusively on explanatory factors at political system and party levels like the status as 
government  or  opposition  party,  the  existence  of  a  single-party  or  coalition  government,  the 
allocation  of  ministerial  portfolios  among  coalition  partners,  pledge  agreement  between 
government/opposition parties as well as between coalition partners, the type of pledge (keeping 
status quo or implementing new policies), media coverage of the pledges, and so on.
Yet, for countries operating in a context of dispersed powers (Powell 2000; Samuels and Shugart 
2003), an exclusive analytical focus on the party level often seems not adequate out of two reasons. 
First, as soon as different political actors at different state levels are forced to govern together, the 
chances that they can stick to their electoral programs decreases. A compromise which is likely to 
find a majority is unlikely to be in line with the electoral programs of all actors involved. Second, 
such  systems  tend  to  produce  weak  party  systems  at  national  level  and  emphasise  the  party-
independent position of the individual MP. This point is further elaborated in the following section.
Switzerland: A multi-party dispersed-powers framework
Political systems which are based on ideas of separation of powers, checks and balances, or power 
sharing do not place the responsibility for policy enactment on the government party (or coalition) 
alone.  Dispersion-of-power  frameworks12 often  go  along  with  a  separation  of  purpose,  i.e.  the 
electorate may assign different kinds of “mandates” to different directly elected bodies, or hold 
separately  elected  institutions  accountable  on  different  grounds  (Samuels  and  Shugart  2003). 
10 According to Ostrogorski (1964: 138) a platform “represents a long list of statements relating to politics, in which 
everybody can find something to suit him, but in which nothing is considered as of any consequence by the authors 
of the document, as well as by the whole convention.” 
11 An exception is the attention recent studies draw to the effects of coalition government (Mansergh and Thomson 
2007; Costello and Thomson 2008) or minority governments (Naurin 2007), as compared to single-party 
governments.
12 This term, following Powell (2000), shall capture all regime types which do not follow a straight parliamentary logic 
and incorporate ideas of separation of powers, power sharing, presidentialism, etc.
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Because of the – to a greater or lesser extent  – mutual  independence of the executive and the 
legislative  branches  and  federalistic  state  structures,  dispersed-powers  regimes  are  often 
accompanied  by candidate-centered  voting  systems  and weak party  structures  which  altogether 
promote the cultivation of personal, party-independent candidate profiles (Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Mitchell 2000). This creates ideological diversity within parties, whereby personal election pledges 
of candidates gain in importance for prospective-voting voters, compared to central party platforms 
in centralised parliamentary systems (see also Mansergh and Thomson 2007). The research level 
thus shifts from parties to individual candidates and MPs.
Switzerland's  political  system  is  a  mixed  regime  type  which  incorporates  elements  both  of 
parliamentarism and presidentialism (Kriesi 2001; Hertig 1978; Lijphart 1984, 1999; Linder 1994; 
Vatter 2008). The Swiss power-sharing system is characterised by highly dispersed powers not only 
in terms of federalism and direct democracy, but also in terms of a joint government of the most 
important  parties  and  changing  majorities  within  government  and  parliament  (Schwarz  2009). 
Incentives to form a stable coalition – both in government and parliament – are low because the 
executive and legislative branches enjoy high mutual independence once the members of the Swiss 
consensus government are elected by the parliament.13
Ad hoc  majority  building  in  the  bicameral  Swiss  legislature  takes  place  within  a  multi-party 
context. Currently, 12 parties share the 200 seats in the lower chamber, 7 parties the 46 seats in the 
upper chamber. Case-by-case coalitions in parliament mean that participation in government and 
legislative success is uncoupled. Other than in strictly parliamentary systems, government parties 
are not always on the winning side, and opposition not always on the losing side. Rather, it is the 
policy area at stake and the stage within the entire law-making process at which legislative vote is 
exactly located which determine which parties will form a coalition, to what extent party unity can 
be expected, and who will be on the winning/losing side (Schwarz 2009). In the last 10 to 15 years, 
the Swiss party system has developed into a triple-pole system of roughly 30 percent vote share 
each: left-wing parties (like Social-democrats SP and the Greens GP), right-wing parties (like the 
Swiss People's Party SVP), and moderate centrist parties like the Christian-democrats (CVP) and 
the Liberals  (FDP) (see Ladner 2007;  Hug and Schulz 2007; Kriesi  2001).  The centrist  parties 
regularly play the role of legislative majority builders by deciding whether they ally with the parties 
at the right or the left side of the council and thus are the most “successful” actors in parliament 
13 Parliamentary or governmental rights to dismiss each other during the constitutionally fixed legislative period of 
four years are entirely lacking.
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(Kriesi 2001; Schwarz et al. 2009; Hug and Sciarini 2009).
What we look at: database and dependent variable
This paper looks at a political system where the linkage between electoral promises of collective 
party  platforms  and  legislative  behaviour  of  individual  MPs  is  supposed  to  be  loose.  Instable 
legislative case-by-case majorities and the powerful position of single MPs compared to the party 
leaders justify a change of the methodological perspective from party to the individual level. This is 
recently made possible by using data from web-based voting assistance applications (VAA). Instead 
of looking at party manifestos we use personal statements of MPs as recorded in the Swiss VAA 
“smartvote”14 and compare them with legislative voting behaviour in the Swiss lower house, the 
National  Council.  Our  focus  therefore  is  not  directed  at  the  collective  enactment  of  political 
programmes by fixed parliamentary majorities, but rather at the commitment of individual MPs to 
enact their own – sometimes party-independent – agenda.
The article compares the answers given to the smartvote questionnaire with identical (or nearly 
identical) parliamentary votes. The smartvote tool was launched in the run-up to the 2003 Swiss 
general  elections and applied for a second time in 2007 (Thurman and Gasser 2009).  The tool 
includes a broad-based questionnaire of 70 (2003) and 73 questions (2007) which allows for a 
reasonably precise analysis of the ideological positions of the candidates and parties (Ladner et al. 
2008b).  In  2003,  smartvote  covered  69.5  percent  of  all  elected  MPs  in  the  200-seat  National 
Council, in the 2007 elections this share mounted to 93.5 percent.
The inspection of the parliamentary debates 2003-2009 detected 34 roll call votes that match with 
an item in the smartvote questionnaire and cover several important policy dimensions (see listing in 
appendix 1). We took into account that pre-election statements are submitted to a half-life and do 
not last forever; thus for the answers of the MPs to the 2003 questionnaire, we only inspected the 
2003-2007  debates,  for  the  answers  to  the  2007  questionnaire  only  the  debates  from  2007 
onwards.15 The maximum time span between the promise and the related parliamentary vote is 
therefore four years (see figure 1).
14 http://www.smartvote.ch  ; the tool which is operated by the non-partisan research network “Politools” in 
Bern/Switzerland, exists since 2003 (for details, see Thurman and Gasser 2009).
15 There are five exceptions to this rule when we took into account parliamentary votes of the preceding term that are 
very close to the election day (items no. 1, 15, and 17-19 in appendix 1).
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Figure 1: Pre- and post-election spheres 2003-2009 taken into account
The smartvote questionnaire provides for four answer options (fully agree, weakly agree, weakly 
disagree,  fully  disagree),  while  parliamentary  votes  allow  for  three  options  only  (yea,  nay, 
abstention). Moreover, smartvote participants have to answer all questions whereas elected MPs 
have the possibility to walk out the chamber or abstain from the vote if they feel unable to make a 
decision. In order to make the two datasets comparable we created a simple proximity matrix (the 
dependent  variable)  which  matches  the  opinions  given  in  the  smartvote  questionnaire  and  the 
legislative vote (see table 1; the value 1 means positional congruence, i.e. no difference between 
pre- and post-election behaviour).16 If an MP did not answer the smartvote questionnaire and/or did 
not take part in a related roll call, no value has been calculated for the concerned item; our data 
sheet is thus unbalanced which needs appropriate statistical  correction of the standard errors in 
individual-level analyses.
Table  1:  Proximity matrix  (congruence)  between  smartvote  answer  and  legislative  behaviour 
(dependent variable)
legislative behaviour
yea nay abstention
smartvote answer
fully agree 1 0 0
weakly agree 1 0 0
weakly disagree 0 1 0
fully disagree 0 1 0
Note: Non-participation in smartvote and/or in a related legislative vote is treated as missing value.
16 Since we operate with a latent dependent variable, alternative definitions with a higher number of ordinal categories 
are conceivable. The underlying rationale for the binary option as specified in table 1 is that more categories might 
contain too many “artificial” subdivisions which are indistinguishable in reality, and which would only increase 
statistical noise. Statistical tests with such alternative specifications with up to five ordinal categories (ordered logit 
models) have largely confirmed the statistical effects of our logit model.
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In the following table some basic information is given on the number of MPs included in the dataset 
and the number of roll call votes analysed.17
Table 2: Number of MPs / roll call votes per party in the dataset
Number of MPs Number of roll calls
2003-2007 2007-2009 total 2003-2007 2007-2009 total
SVP 46 55 61 561 739 1300
SP 55 42 62 759 576 1335
FDP 35 29 44 349 379 728
CVP 31 30 38 359 388 747
GP 16 21 27 198 285 483
others 17 14 22 178 173 351
total 200 191 254 2404 2540 4944
A preliminary glance at the dependent variable reveals that – contrary to common perception but in 
line with findings from (party-related) research cited above – Swiss MPs usually stick to their pre-
election statements (see table 3 which depicts the average positional congruence per MP and party 
over all 34 selected items). There are however quite large differences between parties. The highest 
congruence between pre- and post-election positions can be found among the leftist parties – the 
Social Democrats (SP) and the Greens (GP) – with values of around 90 percent, and the right-wing 
national-conservative SVP close to 85 percent.  The lowest positional congruence show the two 
centrist parties, the Christian Democrats (CVP) and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP): their average 
positional congruence is around 75 percent. The figures also show the range within each party: 
While among Green MPs the lowest mean positional congruence score is as high as 75 percent, the 
lowest congruence mean is found within the two centrist parties with 50 percent, which means that 
on average these MPs changed their minds in 50 percent of the selected items.
17 It should be kept in mind that table 2 lists all MPs included in the analysis, also those that replaced a previous MP. 
This means that the total number of 200 (2003-2007) is merely a coincidence with the number of seats in the 
National Council.
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Table 3: Value range and mean positional congruence per MP and party
Mean
(Std. dev.)
Min. Max. N
(no. of MPs)
SVP 0.841 (0.060) 0.68 0.94 61
SP 0.907 (0.061) 0.71 1.00 62
CVP 0.725 (0.090) 0.50 0.86 38
FDP 0.772 (0.081) 0.50 0.94 44
GP 0.894 (0.067) 0.75 0.97 27
Legend: 0 = no congruence over all 34 items, 1 = full congruence.
These preliminary findings confirm that the commitment to stick to pre-election positions is not 
evenly spread among MPs but contingent on additional factors like party membership. This shall be 
further examined in the following sections in which some explaining factors are presented and their 
effects on positional congruence tested in a multivariate model.
What factors might explain a change of mind?
Why do some MPs stick to their pre-election positions and others do not? Unlike existing research 
which is  limited on party-  and system-level  factors the present article combines individual and 
possible party- or system-level explanations.
Positional incongruence with party group majority. Positional congruence by an MP is more likely 
if the majority of the party group takes up the same stance on the issue. If an MP finds out after the 
election that the majority of his or her fellow party colleagues takes another position the propensity 
should increase that he/she will conform to the majority position, most likely due to peer-group 
pressure as Swiss party group leaders do not have strong formal instruments at hand to discipline 
their group members (Hertig 1978; Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999). The variable is binary, analogically 
defined to the dependent variable.18
Positional centrality of the party. As seen before, Swiss legislative parties do not form a permanent 
coalition,  but  operate  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Beneficiaries  of  this  situation  are  mainly  the 
moderate parties in the political centre which regularly play the role of legislative majority builders 
18 If no majority in the party group could be detected (e.g. if a tie occurred) or if the majority of the party group 
abstained, any smartvote answer was rated as congruent with party group majority.
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by deciding whether they ally with the parties at the right or the left side of the council (Kriesi 
2001; Schwarz et al. 2009; Hug and Sciarini 2009). The preliminary results in the previous section 
further  suggest  that  this  “constructive”  role  of  the  central  players  comes  at  least  partly  at  the 
expense of positional congruence (which is also our hypothesis). In the multivariate analysis, the 
CVP, FDP/Liberals, and some smaller moderate parties19 are considered as centrist parties in Swiss 
parliament.20
Size of the electoral district and candidate-centredness. In national elections, the electoral districts 
are the 26 Swiss cantons. Their size varies between 1 and 34 seats, according to population figures. 
The  voting  system  is  first-past-the-post  (FPTP)  in  the  6  single-member  districts  (SMD),  and 
proportional  representation (PR) in  the 20 multi-member districts  (MMD).  According to  voting 
theory, the electoral connection is closer in small districts (Carey and Shugart 1995; Cox 1997; 
Bowler and Farrel 1993), mainly because it is easier to keep track of just a few MPs. We would 
therefore hypothesise that the propensity to disregard election pledges is higher in larger districts 
than in smaller ones. Moreover, in Switzerland's MMDs, an open-list preference-voting system is 
applied with the possibility to modify any party list by vote-splitting (panachage) and cumulation 
(putting a preferred candidate twice on the list). Carey and Shugart (1995) thus classify the Swiss 
voting  system  as  relatively  candidate-centred  within  the  variety  of  PR  systems.  For  the 
operationalisation of candidate-centredness we use as proxy variable the actual rate of modified 
party lists in each electoral district  in the 2003 and 2007 elections, which ranges between 29.4 
(canton of Geneva in 2007) and 78.0 percent (canton of Valais in 2003). For SMDs the value is set 
to 100 percent by default. As with the size of the electoral district we can hypothesise that the less 
candidate-centred (or the more party-centred) the election is the less committed to pledge fulfilment 
the MPs are.
Issues and issue dimensions. According to salience theory, party manifestos mainly highlight issues 
which are relevant and important to the party in question, whereas the smartvote questionnaire is 
composed  of  the  full  range  of  political  areas.  It  seems  safe  to  assume  that  election  pledges 
concerning issues which are more important to an MP (or his or her party) are more often respected 
than issues which are quite irrelevant. Since we have neither individual nor party-level data about 
the importance attached to specific issues, we try to detect the core issues of each party by looking 
19 Mainly the Evangelic People's Party (EVP) and the Green-Liberal Party (GLP).
20 This classification between centrist and non-centrist parties can also be based on repeated analysis of voting 
behaviour with multidimensional scaling technique (e.g. Hermann/Jeitziner 2008; see also 
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.ch).
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at the homogeneity of the responses to the smartvote questionnaire by all candidates of a specific 
party, assuming that the candidates of that party show higher agreement on the party’s core issues.21 
To operationalise the variable we proceed the following way: For each party and each of the two 
smartvote surveys we calculate the mean standard deviation of the responses to all issues belonging 
to one of the following eight policy dimensions (according to the classification made by smartvote): 
Foreign policy, migration, law and order, society and ethics, economy, finances, social welfare, and 
environment. This leaves us with a mean standard deviation per party and dimension. From these 
we select those three dimensions with the lowest standard deviation and consider them as the core 
dimensions of the respective party.
Relevance of the vote. Not every roll call is equally significant within the legislative process. Some 
votes  may  have  a  direct  law-making  effect  (e.g.  votes  concerning  drawn-up  bills  which  were 
introduced by the government or the parliament itself), others merely charge the administration to 
consider the introduction of a law-making proposal (e.g. parliamentary motions). Recent research 
has  shown that  the importance of  a  vote  affects  legislative behaviour  of Swiss  MPs (Hug and 
Sciarini  2009; Schwarz 2009).  Out of the 34 selected items 20 are government bills  which are 
assigned a high relevance and 3 are parliamentary motions with low relevance assigned. 11 items 
concern parliamentary initiatives which may have a different status, depending on whether the vote 
is related to the initial phase (low relevance in 5 cases) or to a bill drawn-up and introduced by a 
legislative committee (high relevance in 6 cases). The effect on pledge fulfilment is theoretically 
ambiguous: On the one hand, it can be argued that the fulfilment rate is higher when less relevant 
votes are concerned because they are safe for position-taking and of little consequence, no matter 
what the result of the roll call is. On the other hand, the publicity of more relevant votes is broader, 
and MPs could feel more obliged to stick to their pre-election promises.
Visibility of the vote.  All votes in the Swiss lower chamber are electronically recorded, but only 
some of them – roughly one third – are made visible to the public (Schwarz 2005; Hug 2005). Until 
recently, unpublished votes were only available for research purposes. MPs know in advance which 
votes will be published so they could at least theoretically adapt their behaviour (Carey 2009). We 
thus hypothesise that we will see higher pledge fulfilment rates in published votes.
Incumbent status.  The effect of incumbent status on pledge fulfilment is ambiguous: On the one 
21 Alternative procedures would be (1) to ask directly the parties or the candidates about their core issues in the 
2003/07 elections, (2) to conduct an expert survey among political scientists, or (3) to extract the core issues by 
ourselves from the party manifestos.
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hand, incumbents know how the wind blows; unlike freshmen, they are more consolidated in their 
political positions and thus less prone to changing their pre-election positions. On the other hand, 
incumbents might be more detached, both from their party and their voters. They have gained self-
confidence from the fact that they have been re-elected at least once which could weaken the chain 
of delegation and broaden political leeways (Shugart et al. 2005; Tavits 2009).
Our analysis further controls for the effects of language (German-speaking majority vs. French- and 
Italian-speaking minority), age, and sex.
Multivariate analysis and discussion of the results
In order to test the hypotheses we estimate different logit models on the basis of individual-level 
data. Some are multilevel models with up to three levels, others traditional logistic regression mod-
els with cluster-corrected standard errors (see results in table 4).22 The dependent variable is the be-
havioural congruence according to table 1 above (dummy variable). In general, the estimated mod-
els perform fairly well. Our main criteria for the evaluation of the model are the plausibility of the 
estimated parameters with regard to theoretical expectations and the robustness of the effects when 
modifying model specifications.23
Table 4 only presents “full-scale” models, i.e. with all independent factors included.24 Beginning 
with socio-demographic and socio-cultural factors, the model does not show any significant effects 
on MPs' issue congruence. The same is true for candidate-centredness of the voting system and 
district size.25 A major exception is the incumbency status which significantly furthers positional 
congruence: The positional reliability of old stagers appears to be higher than that of newcomers.
Among the factors relating to the nature of the parliamentary vote at  stake, visibility and issue 
dimension play a significant role: Positional congruence is significantly higher if individual voting 
behaviour is published, and if the topic of the vote belongs to a party's core issues. Both effects are 
in agreement with theoretical expectations.
22 Multilevel models are mixed-effects logistic regression models using the xtmelogit command in Stata 10.1, the 
traditional logit models used the Stata cluster option for the MP index variable.
23 An additional robustness criterion was the effect of alternative specification of the dependent variable. As noted 
earlier, these tests did not cause substantial changes which suggests quite a robust setting.
24 All tests on possible multicollinearity problems showed a negative result and model estimators remained stable 
when factors were removed or added.
25 This also holds if we use the log of the district size.
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Again as theoretically expected, an MP's change of mind is significantly more likely if his or her 
pre-election statement is in disagreement with the majority position of fellow party members. The 
model indicates for this factor by far the biggest effect of all variables taken into account, with a 40 
times higher probability for a positional change.
Moreover, positional centrality of a party affects the congruence between pre-election statements 
and  post-election  behaviour  negatively.  This  result  is  again  in  line  with  our  theoretical 
considerations and means that party members from the political  centre  (CVP, FDP, EVP, GLP) 
change their minds more often than MPs of other parties.
As already noted, the effects of the different models remain remarkably stable, even if we control 
for different levels.
How should the results be interpreted? First of all, positional congruence has nothing to do with 
socio-demographic  or  socio-cultural  characteristics  of  individual  MPs.  Furthermore,  there  is  no 
reason to believe that district properties like its size or the effort voters take in modifying party lists 
(as a proxy variable for the candidate-centredness of the voting system) make any difference.
Among the factors that have a significant effect there is one major explanation which outshines 
everything else: If an MP's smartvote position contravenes the majority position of his or her party 
group, it is quite unlikely that this MP adheres to his or her pre-election statement. Put in simple 
bivariate  figures  (table  not  shown  here),  if  the  smartvote  position  contradicts  the  party  group 
position,  in roughly two thirds of the cases MPs adopt during the legislative vote  the majority 
opinion of their fellows. However, if pre-election pledge and majority position of the legislative 
party  group correspond,  a  switch  of  position  is  seen  in  a  marginal  number  of  the  cases  only. 
Possible  explanations  are  three-pronged:  First,  focusing on the parliamentary group,  which has 
either a “natural” socialising effect on its MPs or asserts strong social pressure to bring deviant MPs 
back  on  the  party  line.  Second,  as  for  the  centre  parties  FDP and  CVP whose  MPs  enjoy 
traditionally  more  leeway than  in  the  case  of  the  Social-democrats  and  the  SVP,  the  coercion 
argument is less convincing. Here it might also be the case that MPs of the more centrist formations 
have on a bigger number of issues weaker preferences which make opinion changes easier. Lastly, a 
third explanation would focus on VAAs and possible strategic answer patterns in the pre-election 
sphere.
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Table 4: Logit predictions for positional congruence between pre- and post-election sphere; binary 
dependent variable.
Logit Multilevel
L1: party,
L2: MP
Multilevel
L1: party, L2: district,  
L3: MP
Fixed-effects parameters:
Minority language .0320876(.1408493)
.0268617
(.1422689)
.0268853
(.1422671)
Age -.0008883(.006515)
.0000346
(.0063257)
.0000337
(.0063257)
Male -.0693244(.1282271)
-.0410135
(.1263573)
-.0410464
(.1263543)
Incumbent .2890817*(.120824)
.2877333*
(.1194782)
.2877381*
(.1194774)
Published vote .456973***(.1383252)
.4772773***
(.1436887)
.4772542***
(.4772542)
Relevance of bill -.0303454(.1120414)
-.0363278
(.1236664)
-.0363182
(.1236665)
Core issue .2646278*(.117759)
.2722447*
(.1148124)
.2722356*
(.1148123)
Candidate-centred voting system .0044403(.0047868)
.0050543
(.0044923)
.0050536
(.0044922)
District size -.0012307(.0056489)
-.0014717
(.0056817)
-.0014712
(.0056816)
Disagreement with party group 
majority
-3.686012***
(.1244307)
-3.687515***
(.1122947)
-3.687548***
(.1122971)
Positional centrality of party -.4092632***(.1084882)
-.4173653**
(.1470686)
-.4173694**
(.1470428)
_cons 2.401327***(.5032611)
2.282713***
(.5382518)
2.282815***
(.5382464)
Random-effects parameters:
Level 1               var(_cons) .0219101(.0505826)
.0128044
(.020101)
Level 2               var(_cons) .012815(.0201109)
2.35e-08
(.000053)
Level 3               var(_cons) .0218947(.0505901)
N 4906 4906 4906
No. of groups (Level 1; Level 2;  
Level 3)
251 (L1: 13;
L2: 251)
(L1: 13; L2: 100;
L3: 251)
p > chi2 (Wald) .0000 .0000 .0000
p > chi2 (LR test vs. logistic  
regression)
.5393 .8962
Log (pseudo-)likelihood -1306.7468 -1306.1294 -1306.4462
Method logit mixed-effects logistic  
regression
mixed-effects
logistic regression
Notes: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries are logit coefficients (standard errors in brackets,  
MP cluster-corrected in case of logit model).
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Three more factors have a constantly significant effect in our models. First, incumbent MPs are 
either more consolidated in their political positions than newcomers or they are in a position which 
allows stronger resistance against party pressure, or both. Second, MPs stick to their pre-election 
statements more frequently if the individual voting behaviour is published and thus visible to the 
media, pressure groups, and interested voters. The causality, however, remains not so clear, because 
there are two types of visible votes: those automatically published by statute, and those published 
on demand of at least 30 MPs. In the latter case, MPs may demand a visible vote because they know 
that they will keep their promise, for instance if saliency is high. Or they force themselves in line in 
an automatically published vote because they know that the media and pressure groups will keep an 
eye on them. Only in this case roll call voting makes the MPs stick to their promises.
This leads to the third factor, the question of core issues, i.e. the political content of a vote. We 
defined this variable pragmatically as those policy areas with the lowest variance among all party 
members in the smartvote questionnaire.  The empirical results confirm that a such defined pre-
electoral unity in specific policy areas coincides with higher pledge fulfilment rates. This makes 
theoretically sense and shows that positional congruence depends on policies, too (although there 
might be an objection to our definition of core issues which does not take into account the saliency 
a party actually attaches to an issue). We will leave this for a later version of this paper.
Conclusion
The paper analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss voting 
assistance application “smartvote” and post-election behaviour  in the Swiss lower house in  the 
period 2003-2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently came 
up in parliament in identical or nearly identical form and compared the positions of individual MPs. 
Unlike  previous  studies  which assessed the program-to-policy linkage of  governments  or  party 
groups  the  present  paper  examined  the  question  at  the  level  of  individual  MPs.  This  seems 
appropriate for political systems that follow the idea of power dispersion between executive and 
legislative branches and multi-party government with case-by-case coalitions in parliament, thus 
creating  a  political  environment  in  which  individual  MPs  before  and  after  elections  enjoy 
substantial leeway to express their own views.
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The results prove that in a notably high number of 85 percent of the cases MPs stick to their pre-
election  positions.  Although  methodological  differences  (individual-level  vs.  party-level 
perspective) make direct comparisons to similar research projects in other countries difficult, the 
average rate in Switzerland appears to be considerably higher than in the U.S. system and almost 
reaches the heights of single-party governments like Britain.
Much more interesting than these figures is the identification of the factors which have an effect on 
positional changes. Our multivariate model estimations show that individual pledge fulfilment is 
neither  driven  by personal  attributes  of  the  MP nor  is  it  contingent  on the  organisation of  the 
electoral  district.  The  results  indicate  that  MPs that  belong to  parties  with a  central  legislative 
majority building position more frequently depart from what they considered true in the pre-election 
sphere: Majority building in a multi-party bicameral legislature without fixed government coalition 
has  to  rely  on  MPs  willing  to  compromise  and  adapt  their  opinion;  within  the  framework  of 
promissory  representation,  we  would  call  these  MPs  trustees.  Moreover,  the  advantage  of 
incumbency, the importance of political issues for a party and the visibility of the individual voting 
behaviour to the public (media, pressure groups, voters) play a prominent role in preventing MPs 
from switching their positions.
However, paramount for the propensity to stick to a pre-election position is (dis-)agreement with the 
majority  position  of  the  own party  group:  If  a  pre-election  statement  contradicts  the  majority 
opinion of the own legislative party, a change of mind becomes some 40 times more likely. On the 
one hand, this sheds light on peer pressure mechanisms in Swiss parliamentary groups. On the other 
hand, with a view to online voting assistance applications like “smartvote”, the results confirm that 
not all statements in online surveys can be put on a level with actual legislative behaviour: some 
issues are “hot potatoes”, which may incite the candidates to strategic answers, and some are of no 
importance the candidates (and their voters), which means that weak preferences or indifference 
prevail. Whatever reason there might be, voters can learn from this result that the farer away a 
candidate's personal profile from his or her party is located,  the weaker is the electoral  link of 
promissory representation.
Some issues are left open for future research. First, one might be interested in the political direction 
of the positional changes (e.g., position-taking at the political poles or movement to the centre?). 
Second,  the  precise  relation  between  positional  changes  within  the  centrist  parties  and  actual 
majority building is  still  underexplored.  And third,  we are  still  puzzling about  the  behavioural 
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grounds for the positional changes between pre- and post-election sphere: strategic use of VAAs, 
weak preference structures of the respondents, or peer pressure in the party group?
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Appendix 1: Description of the 34 smartvote statements / legislative votes
No. Issue Policy area(s) smartvote 
version
Date of le-
gislative 
vote
1 Simplified naturalization of 2nd and 3rd genera-
tion of immigrants
migration 2003 03.10.2003
2 Adoption of children by homosexual couples society & ethics 2003 03.12.2003
3 Higher spending for the armed forces law & order
finances & taxes
2003 09.12.2003
4 EU membership foreign policy 2003 16.12.2003
5 Splitting TV/radio licence fees between public 
and private TV/radio stations
-- 2003 03.03.2004
6 Keeping a nationwide network of post office 
branches
economy, finances 
& taxes
2003 19.03.2004
7 Higher remuneration for MPs -- 2003 08.10.2004
8 Higher spending for agriculture economy, finances 
& taxes
2003 01.12.2004
9 Disclosure of the salaries of board members and 
CEOs in companies listed on the stock exchange
economy 2003 02.03.2005
10 Standstill agreement on genetically modified or-
ganisms in agriculture and food
economy, envir-
onment
2003 17.06.2005
11 Freedom of choice between military service and 
alternative civilian service
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2003 14.12.2005
12 Keeping reduced VAT rate for tourism services economy, fin-
ances & taxes
2003 14.12.2005
13 Privatisation of the national telecommunication 
supplier "Swisscom"
economy 2003 10.05.2006
14 Higher spending for day care and crèches social welfare, 
society & ethics
2003 07.06.2006
15 Storing soldiers’ service weapons in the armoury law & order 2007 22 Mar / 27 
Sept 07
16 Introduction of English as the first foreign lan-
guage in schools
-- 2003 21.06.2007
17 Basic health insurance coverage of complement-
ary medicine (alternative medicine)
social welfare 2007 19.09.2007
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18 Deployment of the army to support civilian units law & order 2007 27.09.2007
19 Ban on smoking in public buildings, restaurants 
and bars
society & ethics 2007 04.10.2007
20 Legalising the possession and consumption of 
cannabis
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2007 10.12.2007
21 Granting nationality at communal level by using 
the ballot box or a communal assembly
migration 2007 17.12.2007
22 Toughening the criminal law for juveniles law & order 2007 19.12.2007
23 Limitations on the environmental associations’ 
right of appeal
economy, envir-
onment
2007 20.03.2008
24 Introduction of a finance referendum at federal 
level
finances & taxes 2007 20.03.2008
25 Extending the free movement of peoples 
between Switzerland and the EU to Bulgaria and 
Romania
foreign policy, 
economy, migra-
tion
2007 28.05.2008
26 Introduction of road pricing environment 2007 03.06.2008
27 Higher spending in the field of development aid foreign policy, 
finances & taxes
2007 10.06.2008
28 Giving young people the right to vote from the 
age of 16
-- 2007 24.09.2008
29 Permission of parallel imports of items protec-
ted by patent
economy 2007 15.12.2008
30 Extending the powers of the security authorities 
to include the preventative monitoring of postal, 
telephone and email traffic
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2007 17.12.2008
31 Ban on the construction of minarets society & ethics 2007 04.03.2009
32 Introduction of a minimum wage economy, social 
welfare
2007 11.03.2009
33 Direct election of the Federal Council (execut-
ive)
-- 2007 30.03.2009
34 Retail price maintenance on books economy 2007 27.05.2009
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